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Russia has already been seeking its economic, social and political model for over 
a century. It has passed through several revolutions, struggled with 
dysfunctional institutions and practices, suffered the unintended consequences 
of choices the nation has made, and fallen from time to time into deep political 
crisis. After the seventy-four-year experiment of state socialism, another 
experiment started, a hasty transformation to capitalism and a liberal 
democratic political system from scratch. 
 
The characterisation of Russia’s political system has revolved around multiple 
concepts, from sovereign democracy to authoritarianism, and different 
descriptions of hybrid systems. Richard Sakwa suggests that it can be 
denominated as a dual system, the characterising feature of which is a 
permanent tension between the constitutional matrix and para-constitutional 
practices of administration. He defines it as a ‘peculiar hybrid’ or ‘dual state 
model’ in which forces favouring normative-constitutional renewal compete 
with the bureaucratic regime that follows the pragmatic-technocratic rationality 
of the administrative system. Although liberal ‘constitutionalism’ has always 
existed to some extent in Russia, the dominant ‘ideological school’ has been 
based around the adherents of the ideas of Russia’s exceptionalism, great power 
and distinct civilization. The significant leverage of partisans for liberal 
democracy and constitutionalism has so far been temporary phenomena in 
Russia. Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term in 2008-2012 has been perceived 
as a last example of that.1 It was followed Vladimir Putin’s third presidential 
term and a return to ‘normality’: to the idea of Russia as a great power and 
strong state. In this chapter, we focus on the population’s perception of the 
strong state. 
 
                                                        
1 The chapter is based on the author’s research in the Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian 
Studies – Choices of Russian modernisation, Funded by the Academy of Finland for the period 
2012-2017. 
The purpose is not to discuss whether the Russian regime is a democratic or 
authoritarian regime or what type of regime the people endorse more. In the 
past, the assumption has been that Russia’s transformation has followed theories 
of democratisation, which has led us to have misleading expectations of the 
direction it would follow and consequently of the methods which Russia’s regime 
would use to consolidate its power. This consolidation is common object of all 
types of regimes, all of them aim to increase the support and consent of their 
subjects: only the methods vary. In this respect we are not speaking about failed 
attempts of Russia’s regime to promote democracy, but about the instruments it 
has successfully used to gain popular support for legitimising its rule.  
 
Besides the dual state model, Russia has commonly been defined as an electoral 
authoritarian regime2. In this chapter, however, it is not essential for to precisely 
define Russia’s political system. We are interested in the methods, which 
Russia’s regime uses to legitimise its position. In this respect, the key concept of 
the chapter is the “strong state”. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro 
remind us that democracy is not the only method used by regimes to gain 
subjects’ consent. They point out that an authoritarian regime is also able to 
consolidate its power if it ‘holds firmly to an undemocratic course and offers 
appropriate sticks and carrots to induce support, then subjects will learn to 
support what the new regime supplies’3. The concept is easy to apply to Russia’s 
case. The perception of “strong state” includes both symbolic and material 
supply by the regime on the one hand, and demands by the subjects on the other. 
This dynamism reproduces conflicting mass perceptions of the strong state, 
which escape strict definitions. My claim is that the regime’s supply of a strong 
state has often been more symbolic (political) than material, and does not meet 
the predominant material (welfare state) demands of the population. 
 
The perception of Russia’s strong state is usually drawn from an interpretation 
of Russia’s unique history caused by a particular type of state formation. Andrei 
Tsygankov’s definition relies on the civilizational approach of Russia’s 
uniqueness. He sees Russia, on the one hand, as an Orthodox state, the ethos of 
which is to protect its subjects from the arbitrariness of the upper and privileged 
stratums of society. On the other hand, he sees her as a country which has a 
unique place in the world as a semi-peripheral great power whose rulers easily 
sacrifice their obligations to the people in order to maintain this status against 
considered external threats4. 
 
Although not agreeing with the path dependency approach, it is easy to agree 
with the assumption that for historical reasons, Russian identity is closely tied to 
an imperial state identity (not ethnic identity) and to the concept of the strong 
state. Therefore, the common perception of the state is a significant variable in 
understanding Russia’s development. The essential feature of Russian identity-
building has been that it is based on the state’s priority over the citizens’ rights, 
which is usually justified by the above-mentioned reasons and the argument 
about the underdevelopment of civil society. Vera Tolz points out that the Soviet 
and pre-revolution tradition of Russia was to forge national unity using the 
strong role of the state. The rulers of the new Russia also followed this after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. They soon turned to the idea to give the state the 
supreme role in the nation-building project. This idea leads back to history and 
its consequence has been state patriotism, the essence of which is that people’s 
unity has been forged through loyalty to the tsar or president and pride in 
serving a strong state5. In this respect, the idea of the strong state encompasses 
an emphasis on symbolic markers of state might.  
 
In general, symbolic markers have a significant role in all societies, and in Russia 
they are crucial in constructing the image of a strong state that, in turn, is an 
essential part of state identity, reproducing citizens’ loyalty to the power. In this 
respect, a common understanding of the state’s unique past reproduces the 
belief in Russia’s particularism and distinctiveness. This idea goes back to the 
Russia’s nineteenth-century discussions. In the Soviet Union, the political 
tendency that promoted Russian nationalism and statism complemented by the 
conviction of particularism was called gosudarstvennichestvo2 (statism). It also 
gained strength within the Soviet establishment in the 1960s-1970s6. 
                                                        
2 Statist had leverage from the intelligentsia to the higher echelons of the party and state 
leadership. 
  
Two Dimensions of The Strong State  
 
We are not taking the strong state as the de facto existing state but discussing 
about how people’s symbolic and material demands on the strong state frame 
their perceptions of the state, and how these two levels of expectations interact, 
interlink and also contradict each other. In 2010, Russians were almost equally 
divided when responding to the question of whether they perceived Russia as a 
strong or weak state7. This rises the question about how people define the strong 
state and what qualities they attach to it.  
 
The second question is how symbolic and material demands interact on the level 
of agency and structure. This allows us to put forward the following question: 
what are the consequences of symbolic demands for the strong state on the 
institutional level when state leaders meet citizens’ material demands for a 
strong welfare state? Here the question of the intended and unintended 
consequences of these demands and the leadership’s response to them also 
comes into the picture. However, in this chapter the question is not analysed in 
detail, inasmuch as its focus is on the analysis of the Levada-Center’s mass 
surveys concerning respondents’ answers (perception) to questions related to 
the strong state.  
 
Russians’ expectation of the strong state’s role has been drawn from three major 
aspects: (1) demand for an overarching welfare state; (2) narration of a glorious 
state history; and (3) Russia’s strong position in the international community. 
These aspects also establish part of the framework for constructing Russia’s 
state identity. The significance of these factors has gained more weight since the 
Ukrainian crisis and the government’s diminished capacity to meet the material 
demands of the population. This leads to asking to what extent and how 
successfully has the regime increased the symbolic supply of a strong state to 
compensate for its diminished capacity of material supply, and what has been 
(and is expected to be) citizens’ response to that. 
 The dilemma of the demand for a strong state is analysed within the frame of the 
four variables presented in the Figure 1 below. It depicts the framework in which 
the symbolic supply and material demand of the strong state is interlinked with 
and produced by agents and institutions. 
 
[Figure 1 is here] 
 
My presumption is that Russians’ popular perception of the necessity of a strong 
state evolved during the past two decades has established a normative frame for 
choices directing the development of society. The reason why this matters is that 
even the most authoritarian societies have to take into account public opinion 
and reproduce the consent of the people, at least among a reasonable proportion 
of the population.3 In this respect, the prevailing values and norms are 
important. Until the murder of Boris Nemtsov, Russia was generally perceived as 
having one of those “electoral authoritarian” regimes which legitimize a regime’s 
power mostly by other means than repression8, although after the assassination, 
some analysts reconsidered their assessment and suggested that it was a turning 
point in the Kremlin’s politics towards its rivals9. Notwithstanding how do we 
estimate these events, the essential point in this chapter is that rulers cannot 
escape from responding to popular demands. 
 
 
The Welfare State 
 
Russia’s dominant feature is the patriarchal welfare model inherited from the 
Soviet Union. People expect that the state will take care of their life, ranging from 
decent living standards and housing to health care. The Levada-Center’s 
nationwide surveys from 2001 to 2010 show clearly indicate that. From 64 to 68 
                                                        
3 Larry Diamond noted: ‘Virtually all hybrid regimes in the world today are quite deliberately 
pseudodemocratic, in that the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as 
multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian 
domination’ (Diamond, 2002: 24). 
% answered that society should be built on the idea that power4 take care of the 
people instead of a system based on popular demand for fulfilling basic 
conditions10. This is a telling example of the conviction that in the end, the state 
knows the basic needs of citizens and the state-society relation is constructed 
accordingly on a top-down basis.  
 
[Figure 2 is here] 
 
It has been the unchangeable expectation that the state is an integral part of 
Russians’ life and that they cannot live without the state’s care11. In general, the 
overwhelming majority supports the idea that the state should use more money 
for improving people’s living standards (67 %) and health care (55 %) and 
protecting people in a socially vulnerable position (52 %). Innovation and 
modernization were mentioned by only 14 % of respondents. Symbolic 
performances to gain international respect and reputation – the Olympics in 
Sochi, Universiada in Kazan5 and the coming Football World Cup in 2018 – were 
unpopular (5 %) and support to similar symbolic events had halved since 
2010.12 
 
The situation becomes even more contradictory when the discussion turns to 
budget cuts in order to allocate money to traditional symbolic objects of the 
strong state. Despite massive state propaganda on the glorious annexation of 
Crimea, only 16 % of respondents accepted giving more budgetary resources to 
the development of Crimea and Sevastopol. 60 % opposed budget cuts in health 
care and education as a whole13. Presumably as an inheritance of the Soviet 
welfare state model, Russians have in general had a strong position against 
reducing payments to health care services and education all down the line. From 
2002 to 2015, support for abandoning free services diminished from 33-35 % to 
25 %. Accordingly, support for free health care and education has varied from 60 
to 76 %, ending up at 73 % in 2015.  
 
                                                        
4 Here ”power” refers to the state institutions, regime. 
5 In summer 2013 the capital of Tatarstan Kazan (Russia) hosted over 10 400 university athletes 
in XXVII Summer Universiade, which made the event biggest ever in the history. 
Surveys show unequivocally that the main reason for criticism is the 
government’s insufficient care for its expected social responsibilities. Although 
openly expressed readiness to pressurize the government has diminished from 
the 37 % peak of 1999, it is still significant that 13 % feel deep dissatisfaction 
and express readiness to force the government to make better politics in 2012. 
We have good reason to assume that the ground is fertile for a quick increase in 
that kind of criticism, taking into account the long-standing general, around 50 % 
dissatisfaction with the government’s response to material demands of 
population. In March 2015, even during the general national euphoria uniting 
people to support Vladimir Putin and the government, up to 49 % of respondents 
answered that the government has given so little to the people that it justifies 
them demanding more or even releases them from all loyalty towards the 
government14. These results signify a remarkable alienation of the population 
and pose a considerable challenge to the legitimacy of the regime. Rose and his 
co-authors point out that the key factor is the extent to which people evaluate 
that the current and future economy affects their living conditions: ‘For each one 
point change in the evaluation of the economy, political support is likely to go up 
or down by just less than half a point’15. 
 
In summary, we can argue that popular demand for a strong state in material 
terms means a demand for a state-controlled welfare system. From 2000 to 
2015, over 50 % of Russians have preferred an economic system that relies on 
state-led planning, which is characterized also as state paternalism. Accordingly, 
support for private ownership and a market-based system has not once 
exceeded one third of respondents16. The argument that the welfare state and a 
strong state are inseparable intertwined is also confirmed by the survey taken in 
December 2014. 68 % of respondents held that Russia is a superpower and 60 % 
(the largest group of respondents) answered that a high standard of living is the 
major feature, which makes a country a superpower17. It also seems that the 
material demand for a welfare state is the most vulnerable part of the regime’s 
policy, and this demand is difficult to replace with any kind of symbolic supply.  
 
Glorious History 
 The narration of Russian history follows a traditional universal model to 
emphasize state history and highlight the role of war heroes. War narrations on 
the sacrifices of the nation to defend strictly defined state borders, the nation’s 
common culture, wealth and leadership have been basic state-building and 
identity-construction instruments of all European nations. Victory Day (May 9) 
and the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) is one 
illuminating example of that in Russia. 
 
The project to write a common history textbook for Russia is a good example of 
the state’s identity-building. The openly expressed aim has been to overcome the 
cleavage between history interpretations, leave disputed questions to smaller 
circle of experts, and encompass all achievements in common history which have 
strengthened state might, regardless of the political system. As a typical national 
state building project, the emphasis of the textbook project has been to work out 
a “standard” state history for schools in the spirit of “love and respect for the 
motherland”. Putin emphasised that it has to give causal interpretations of the 
periods of Russian state, and explain how they all have been “logically 
interconnected”. He underlined in emotional tone the necessity to resist the 
falsification of the history of the Great Patriotic War (GPW) and the role of the 
Soviet Union in the East Europe after the WW II6 because, as he alleged that 
contemporary interpretations contain “ideological grab”. Putin claimed that 
“some governments” produce false interpretations for political reasons, and it is 
“spit in our face”.18 The presidential interpretation of continuum of thousand 
years state history from Kiev Rus to now and the GPW are nothing new and not 
connected only to Putin’s person. During his presidency also Dmitry Medvedev 
emphasised the fundamental importance to keep consensus in interpreting the 
history of the GPW: “it is crucial to have maximum consensus in society and 
within the political establishment. Otherwise, this may take us in a very wrong 
direction.19 
 
                                                        
6 He refers the interpretations of the Eastern European and Baltic states in which the role of the 
post-war Soviet Union has been often described as an occupant. 
Consequently the symbolic importance of the Victory Day (VD) is evident since it 
merges competing interpretations of past experiences of the GPW and two 
dominant conflicting interpretations of the future of Russia. On the one hand, 
Russia’s future is seen to be associated with other great European powers 
(without the Stalinist “black history”) as a continuity of the anti-Hitler coalition 
and the liberation of Europe; on the other, Russia is seen as a unique Eurasian 
imperial power continuing its unique historical form of state and political 
system. Within the later frame, Stalin is understood as a historical necessity, 
comparable to Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.  
 
The message that the regime has supplied to the public in commemorating VD 
has always been connected to the changes in the domestic and international 
situation. During recent years, the emphasis has turned from grief for the fallen 
people to celebration of the victory of war. In 2015, the first impression of VD is 
less than before (2010) a commemoration day for millions of fallen people (26% 
- 18%) but increasingly an official state celebration (26% - 31%). The second 
feature is that VD is in general respectively perceived less than before as a day 
for war veterans (23% - 16%), and the way in which it should be commemorated 
is less connected than before with taking care of war veterans (56% - 49%)20. 
The symbolic significance of VD is increasingly important, and it is assessed as 
equal to one’s own birthday (42%) in 2015. Only the New Year (80%) and the 
birthdays of family members and close friends (44%) are rated higher than VD. 
All other traditional feasts and celebrations come far behind21. 
 
The interpretation of Stalin’s role in the GPW and in Soviet history has deeply 
divided Russia. This is clearly seen from surveys as well as public discussion. 
Statists, both Westernizers7 and Eurasianists, attempt to distinguish themselves 
from the Stalinist socialist ideology and terror but echo at least to some extent 
the idea of the strong state as synonym of strong leadership as a prerequisite of 
the Victory in the war. At the same time, anti-Stalinist liberals advocating a more 
                                                        
7 In 1840s Russian discourse divided to two parties in which dividing line crystallized in different 
position on Europe. The common denomination for the Romantic nationalists was Slavophiles. 
Westernisers looked at Europe as political and economic model.  
decentralized state model are pushed into the corner as protagonists of a weak 
state and at worst as an unpatriotic “fifth column”.  
 
When asking about citizens’ attitudes towards Stalin, surveys show that from 
2001 to March 2015, a significant proportion (38-39 %) of respondents have had 
a permanently positive attitude to him. It is worth noting that the positive 
attitude dropped to its lowest level (31-32%) during Medvedev’s presidency and 
his cautious but consistent attempts to reinterpret the history of the Great 
Patriotic War and Stalin. The proportion of those who agree that the ‘sacrifices of 
the Soviet people during Stalin’s reign are justified by the great goals and results 
achieved during that time’ has increased considerably from 2011-2012 to March 
2015, from 25-30 % to 46 %. Disagreement slumped from 60 % to 41 % 
respectively. When the questions concerns Stalin’s role beyond the war, the 
picture changes. Russians do not want to return to a Stalinist society and usually 
over 50 % of respondents connect his name with repression and crimes against 
people. However, between 2013 and 2015 an apparent turn in perceptions 
occurred, and the share of those who see Stalin’s role in a negative light 
decreased from 55 to 46 %22.  
 
The change is statistically significant and we can expect that it reflects the 
general atmosphere in Russia, which has substantially turned towards harder 
and more authoritarian attitudes during the Ukrainian crisis. There is also 
evidence that the politics of history pursued by the state leadership have 
influenced changes in public opinion. Negative attitudes towards Stalin were at 
their highest level during the first five years after the presidential term of Boris 
Yeltsin. During Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency the proportion of indifferent 
attitudes peaked, ending up at 38 % in 2010. It is still worth noting that negative 
or positive attitudes did not change significantly during his term. The beginning 
of Vladimir Putin’s third term was the significant turn although it is hard to say 
to what extent Putin’s politics of history and to what extent the Ukrainian crisis 
have influenced this turn. But drawing on the general change of attitudes shown 
by surveys, one might assume that conflict with the West and the Ukrainian 
crisis have been the decisive factor in recent changes. 
 President Medvedev’s interview in Izvestiya on May 7, 2010 just before the 65th 
anniversary Victory Day celebrations can be seen as the Westernizer-statists’ last 
attempt to solve the dilemma of celebrating the Great Patriotic War and utilising 
it for the idea of a strong state without Stalin’s politically counterproductive 
reputation in the domestic and international arenas23. For the first time since 
Khrushchev, Russia’s head unreservedly questioned Stalin’s role as a war hero. 
Medvedev stressed that Victory Day did not commemorate the victory of Stalin, 
his totalitarian regime and his generals, but the victory of the people. He also 
explicitly denounced Stalin’s crimes: ‘So despite the fact that he worked hard, 
despite the fact that under his leadership the country flourished in certain 
respects, what was done to our own people cannot be forgiven’. At that time, 
common opinion endorsed Medvedev’s statement, since approximately 60 % of 
respondents shared this view in 2008-201224. Medvedev attempted to distance 
victory from the Soviet Union – a “totalitarian regime” which pursued its own 
interests after the War in Eastern Europe – and shifted the credit for the victory 
to the people and the Red Army, as he worded it. However, Medvedev made a 
concession to people who still admired Stalin as a war leader, saying that 
‘admiration and respect is understandable and their right’. This can be seen as a 
typical example of Statists’ attempts to balance Russians’ divided popular 
opinion on Stalin and the Great Patriotic War. 
 
After Medvedev’s short “de-Stalinization” period a significant return to the 
traditional began. From 2012 to 2015, those who agreed with the claim that the 
sacrifices made during Stalin’s reign were justified by the great goals and results 
achieved during that time jumped from 25 to 46 %. This definitely says 
something essential about the prevailing atmosphere in Russia. Putin and the 
government have trumpeted the demand that people have to sacrifice and suffer 
from the hardships of Russia’s economy before redemption from their troubles 
will come. This type of view is consistent with public perceptions on state-
society relations regardless of their views on history. Furthermore, the surveys 
also demonstrate a high public demand for the “strong hand” in present-day 
Russia. 
 [Figure 3 is here] 
 
However, all surveys show that the majority of Russians do not want to return to 
a Stalinist or even late Soviet type of society: 38% of respondents supported 
these ideas in 2015. At the same time, in 2014-2015 only 12-15 % of 
respondents believed that Russia is developing towards authoritarianism or a 
dictatorship. A large proportion of respondents (36-38%) answered in 2014-
2015 in a politically correct way that the best characterization of the prevailing 
political situation in Russia is ‘development of democracy’. It is noteworthy that 
the proportion of unsure respondents who could not or did not want to answer 
shot up from 21 % in 2014 to 30 % in 201525.  
 
A Great Power 
 
The Ukrainian crisis is an illuminating example of how significantly and quickly 
changes in international relations affect Russia’s domestic developments. As 
Andrei Tsygankov points out, ‘the Ukrainian crisis increased the basis of internal 
support for the state and created conditions for a new consolidation of power’. 
He also puts forward the common claim in Russia that ‘a strong state is 
necessary in order to improve the quality of Russia's elite and its political 
system’. The strong state must have a strong role in planning the economy in 
order to develop Russia’s international competitiveness26. His claim is partly 
based on the assumption of Russia’s distinct and unique development path to 
modernity, although the other part of the explanation draws from theories 
connected to Russia’s semi-peripheral position in the world economy. 
 
Tsygankov, among others, has defined the current divide in Russian thinking 
between different orientations (Slavophiles – Westernizers) in which 
Westernizers have been divided into two groups. One is Liberal (European-
orientated) Westernizers and the other Statists (derzhavniki), who see Russia’s 
future as a Eurasian state comprising the former Soviet space, including its Asian 
part. In this respect, the Russian strong state must keep a distance from both 
Europe and Asia, combining them as a special civilizational world culture, 
Eurasian Russia. In Russian thinking, the Statists represent a tendency that is 
closely linked with the “realist school”. For realists, international relations are 
power politics in which a state’s might is seen in terms of military and economic 
capacity, state borders and political leverage. In this worldview, political anarchy 
is the dominant feature of international relations, which should be resisted by 
the strong Russian state. With reference to several surveys, this perception 
seems to be shared widely in Russian society.  
 
In international relations, the perception of strong state appears through 
symbolic actions accompanying some real political achievements. During recent 
years, beyond the Crimea annexation, a prominent feature of Putin’s policy has 
been endeavours to gain international recognition for Russia’s great power 
status, symbolic victories and respect. In this vein, one of Russia’s largest 
successes has been the Olympic Games in Sochi. Although Russians appreciated 
Sochi as the most important event, even more important than the collapse of the 
rouble in 201427 a small minority, 10 % in 2014 and only 5 % in 2015, wanted to 
allocate budget money to any symbolic mega-events which aim to increase the 
state’s international reputation28. 
 
At the same time, the annexation of Crimea is perceived as proof that Russia has 
returned to the superpower class. In twenty years, from 1994 to 2014, those who 
perceive Russia as a superpower has increased from 14 % to 68 %. In 2008 and 
2012, slightly less than half held Russia as a superpower, which means that the 
post-Crimea jump has been about 20 %29. 
 
There is a contradiction in the fact that the perception of Russia’s drastically 
improved international position refers strongly to the Crimea effect, but the 
annexation of Crimea is still mainly perceived as a symbolic upgrade of 
superpower status. The definitions how people characterize a superpower do 
not meet reality in Russia. Approximately 60 % of respondents attach 
superpower status to a high standard of living, social equality and economic and 
industrial capacity. Military might (44%) comes closest to the Crimea case as a 
proof of traditional superpower status, but it meets only weakly people’s 
readiness to improve military capacity (20%). It is not a priority for respondents 
if the alternative is an improvement in living standards (73%)30.  
 
The only aspect in surveys, which refers to Russia’s superpower status, is rather 
symbolic than material. From 2000 to November 2014, approximately 65 % of 
respondents have answered that they prefer to live in ‘a large country that is 
respected and sometimes feared by other countries’ rather than a ‘small, 
comfortable and non-threatening country’31. This shows the extent of cleavage 
between demand for the material features of a strong state and the regime’s 
mainly symbolic supply, which has given a boost to the general perception that 
Russia is a strong state. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In many respects under the surface of the regime’s public performance can be 
found several weaknesses, inabilities to reproduce its capacities, dysfunctional 
performances of institutions and unintended results of policy. Inconsistency is 
visible between citizens’ essential material expectations of the strong state and 
the regime’s tendency to rely on a symbolic supply of the strong state. 
 
So far, however, the symbolic supply of the strong state has sufficiently 
substituted for a material supply; the regime’s diminished capacity to respond to 
the population’s demands for better living standards. Up until now, it has also 
strengthened the equation of the strong state with the strong leader (strong 
hand), and the conviction that order and control are more important than 
democracy and that on an institutional level, the parliament and parties are less 
trustworthy and supported than the president – namely, Putin32. During Putin’s 
presidency, almost 70 % of respondents have considered that it is beneficial to 
Russia that ‘power is concentrated almost entirely in the hands of Vladimir 
Putin’. Only 15 % answered that this promises bad things for Russia. The 
demand for a “strong hand” is not only a symbolic demand but one taken literally 
on the institutional level. Furthermore, although half of respondents agree that 
Putin is tough enough, as many as 38 % think that he should be tougher. The 3 % 
proportion that thinks that he is too tough is within the statistical error.33.  
 
After the annexation of Crimea, about half of Russians hold Putin’s biggest merit 
accomplishment to be to ‘return Russia to its status as a great and respected 
world power’. Securing the country’s stability comes behind that, and raising 
salaries, pensions, stipends and allowances is perceived as only the fourth most 
important achievement (by 29 %)34. In the same vein, direct anti-democratic 
sentiments hold strong. Between 1998 and March 2015, a large majority of 
respondents have held order to be more important than democracy. The 
fluctuation range of those who prefer order over democracy has been from 56 % 
during the opposition’s protests in 2010 to 85 % in 2000 after Yeltsin’s term. 
Some of the strongest support for democracy in this survey was measured in 
2015: 21 % answered that democracy is more important than order. It is 
characteristic, however, that 61 % of respondents preferred order over 
democracy35. 
 
Parallel to trust in a strong hand, trust in democratic institutions and law 
enforcement agencies is at a very low level. Besides the performance of the State 
Duma being perceived as the worst of all elected institutions (president, 
government, governors), about half of respondents do not believe that the law 
protects them. People name three main reasons for this: corruption and unfair 
and non-objective consideration (45 %); citizens are not equal before the law 
because those in power think that they are above the law and the laws are not 
written for everyone (44 %); and laws are loosely and arbitrary interpreted by 
those in power (37 %)36. 
 
The simultaneous distrust in democratic institutions and law enforcement 
agencies and belief in the necessity of a strong state has significant 
consequences. The first is the conviction that it is necessary for the regime to 
draw its legitimacy from a strong leader rather than a democratic system and 
organized collective interest groups. On the one hand, distrust in institutions and 
alienation from society leads to cynicism and passivity, and on the other, support 
for a paternalist system in which the state, its leader and collective institutions 
have priority over citizens’ rights. The concept does not create a favourable 
environment for the development of western-type modern citizenship and civil 
society. It endorses the continuum of para-constitutional practice of regime. The 
second consequence is that Russia is apt to orientate towards narrow 
modernization, focusing on the material basis of the physical infrastructure, 
production forces, and efficiency of institutions, which is often understood as 
obedience to superiors. Citizens do not have a means of influencing societal 
development and the regime has difficulty getting the necessary feedback and 
response from the citizens. In this context, Dieter Segert links both distrust in 
institutions and citizens not being capable of influencing societal development to 
the transformation period. He emphasises that the transformation in the 1990s 
caused great social insecurity for the majority of the population in the post-
socialist world, which diminished their chances to control the political elite. In 
the 1990s, during the Yeltsin’s shock therapy Russia experienced an exceptional 
drastic collapse of the major elements of citizens’ welfare and social policy8. As 
Segert argues, this explains partly Russians’ political indifference: without 
effective social policies and a fair distribution of wealth citizens are constrained 
in participating in political affairs37. Furthermore, high social insecurity also 
explains the steady popular demand for a strong welfare state.  
 
Citizens’ material demands, in particular concerning the welfare state, are 
responded to asymmetrically: the regime is unable to increase material 
investments in people’s well-being and attempts to replace the deficit with a 
higher-profile symbolic supply. The annexation of Crimea has served that 
purpose well, since it has been used by the regime and perceived by the people 
as the most important achievement of Russia as a great power. For the general 
public, it has been a real achievement of defending Russia’s geopolitical interests 
and the ‘Russian world’ (Russkiy Mir) – Russians beyond Russian territory. 
Symbolically it has translated as Putin’s manoeuvre to restore Russia’s national 
pride internationally, its recognition as a great power and as a defence of Russian 
                                                        
8 Demographic catastrophe of these years has still significant consequences in contemporary 
Russia.  
culture and history. Putin’s speech on Crimea to the deputies of Duma on March 
18, 2014, was fully loaded of meanings referring explicitly to these symbolic 
markers starting from the first sentences: “Everything in Crimea speaks of our 
shared history and pride”. In the same chapter Putin mentioned Russian 
spirituality, how they were baptised as Christians in Crimea, Orthodox 
civilizational unity of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and military glory and “graves 
of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire” and 
Sevastopole as the birthplace of Russian Black Sea Fleet.38 
 
The conclusion of the crucial symbolic role of Crimea in replacing material 
demands so far can be confirmed by referring to a couple of recent surveys. 
Although taking into account the political and social pressure to support the 
state leadership and its policies, the results show the main tendency without 
question. In March 2015, the survey shows that the ‘accession of Crimea to 
Russia’ was supported by 88 % of respondents. The share of those who 
answered definitely yes was 55 % and probably yes 33 %. The numbers have 
been stable from March 2014, even though people have a quite realistic 
understanding of the EU’s attitude. Although 64 % believe that the EU will 
extend sanctions against Russia, the support has not diminished into early 2015. 
By that time, 72 % of respondents answered that instead of finding a 
compromise with and making concessions to the West in order to get the 
sanctions lifted, Russia should continue its current approach towards Ukraine39. 
 
It also seems that the weight of the statists’ idea has greatly increased during the 
Ukrainian crisis. In the survey made in April 2015 as many as 50 % hold the 
opinion that Russia should ‘expand its territories to include regions of 
concentrated Russian-speaking populations’. Only 23 % are against and 19 % 
cannot answer. Majority of Russians have turned their backs on Europe, looking 
more inward and to increasing extent to the East. Only 21 % wanted Russia to 
join the EU in the foreseeable future, and 20 % wanted to become EU citizens. 
Nonetheless, an increased anti-western mood is not the only possible 
interpretation of these results. The second plausible conclusion is that the survey 
reflects citizens’ general understanding of Russia’s relation with the West and 
the EU. Furthermore, surveys show that people are quite confused about Russia’s 
orientation and consequently also her state identity. In a referendum on joining 
the EU or the Customs Union with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 9 % would 
vote for the EU, 20 % did not know, 28 % would not vote and 43 % were for the 
Customs Union40. 
 
It seems clear that the Western European path, catching up with the European 
route of broad modernization is out of the question in the near future. Support 
for the state-led economy and current electoral authoritarian Russian or Soviet 
type of political system is strong, at 60 %. The western type of democracy has 
never been favoured much, but in 2015 its support slumped to 11 %, compared 
with 32 % in 199841. This refers to the assumption that the legitimacy of the 
regime is still quite strong in spite of all commonly criticized deficits. Since there 
is no public demand for broad modernization, the Russian leadership does not 
have any incentive to promote it, particularly if the conflict with the West 
continues. The question of regime’s capacity to meet material demands of the 
population and its ability to compensate deficits by symbolic supply remain 
unclear. Without doubt the contradiction have potential to cause unpredictable 
consequences to the political development in the future. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Dimensions of the Strong State in Russia 
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Figure 2 The State as an Integral Part of People’s life in Russia (Levada-Center, 
2010b) 
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Figure 3 Perceptions of State-Society Relations in Russia (Levada-Center, 2010c) 
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